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The major challenge in securing the homeland is to provide for all citizens 
effective and capable prevention and responsiveness to chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive events.  States have different homeland security organization 
structures, priorities, funding strategies, and implementation methods.  Consequently, the 
nation lacks a clear, uniform prevention and response strategy that translates into an 
overall capability that cannot be qualitatively defined.  To combat this situation, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has linked future funding to implementation of 
a holistic approach to homeland security program strategies, which include implementing 
intrastate and interstate regional approaches that effectively leverage resource sharing. 
North Dakota responded to funding reductions by addressing its first 
comprehensive statewide regional plan to develop a more efficient and effective 
homeland security program; however, actual implementation was not realistic.  A tiered 
approach to sharing resources through regionalization means jurisdictional capability 
levels will be thoroughly examined and homeland security allocations distributed 
accordingly.  Local jurisdictions in North Dakota exhibit very independent attitudes; 
instituting regionalization, which changes levels of funding, is controversial.  Therefore, 
it was vital to first devise a plan that determined statewide acceptability for a regional 
approach.  It was also deemed necessary to develop standardized baseline equipment lists 
corresponding to each of the four levels of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
capability as defined by DHS.  The baseline lists provide specific guidance, direction and 
clarity for equipment purchasing decisions and circumvents the complex and disjointed 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The major challenge in securing the homeland is to provide for all citizens the 
most efficient and effective capability to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from  a 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) event within the 
context of available funding.  States have different homeland security organizational 
structures and strategies, which ensures inconsistent policies and protocols.  Several 
including North Dakota allocate funds to individual counties in which local homeland 
security spending decisions are often determined in isolation, thereby, creating vastly 
different planning, training, exercising, and purchasing priorities.  As a result, sharing 
needed resources to fill capability gaps is implemented haphazardly among local 
jurisdictions.  This lack of uniformity has the net effect of creating weak links in 
prevention, response and recovery activities throughout the entire nation.  
 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seems to be cognizant of this 
situation and has linked future funding to the implementation of a comprehensive 
approach to homeland security program strategies, which includes implementing 
intrastate and interstate regional approaches that effectively leverage resource sharing. 
Consequently, all states need to facilitate an integrated, coordinated methodology for 
sharing resources applied across geo-political areas to bring a more holistic connectivity 
to the national homeland security program. 
Homeland Security funding taken from areas of the country considered at lower 
perceived risk was then distributed to accommodate cities and states possessing greater 
perceived risk and larger population bases.  Dramatic funding cuts in many states demand 
those states leverage dollars and resources to create effective capabilities to prevent and 
respond.  Many terrorist events are planned and destructive devices/materials assembled 
in rural settings then transported to the target. Residents in Los Angeles, New York and 
Chicago are very much at risk if states like North Dakota cannot build an effective 
capability across all prevention and response disciplines.   
 Beginning April 2004, North Dakota responded to funding reductions by 
addressing its first comprehensive statewide regional implementation plan to develop a 
more efficient and effective homeland security program.  Due to process complexity 
2 
involving local control issues and the legislatively mandated department reorganization, 
actual implementation was not realistic.  Therefore, this thesis will determine stakeholder 
level of acceptance for a regional concept to serve as an important determinant for 
policymakers in moving a regionalization process forward.  If progress moves past the 
acceptance phase, various specific regional plan and/or requirement ideas gathered and 
documented in this initial step will form the precursor to implementation of North 
Dakota’s regional plan predicated upon levels of capability.   
The thesis also will document the process used to develop specific equipment lists 
matched to each of the four levels of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response as 
defined in the State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program Reference 
Handbook1.  The equipment list2 for each level will be extremely valuable in determining 
a jurisdiction’s particular equipment needs and will assist in determining tiered levels of 
response.  
Instituting a regional homeland security approach in North Dakota as well as 
other states involves a paradigm shift not only in jurisdictional thinking and operational 
behavior but also in distribution of financial assistance, which usually dictates political 
ramifications, at the federal, state, local and tribal levels.  The goal of a systems-based 
approach to build, sustain and improve national preparedness for all threats of natural and 
technological hazards is through prevention, protection, response and recovery.  Each 
area includes capabilities that require collaboration among multiple jurisdictions and 
disciplines, including the private sector.  The focus of implementing a regional approach 
will be to build capabilities to prevent and respond. 
The methodology used to determine acceptability and the equipment lists is 
intended to reveal gaps, excess and deficiencies, which aligns directly with the National 
Preparedness Goal3 and may have practical application for other states.    
 
                                                 
1 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, State Homeland Security 
Assessment and Strategy Program Reference Handbook, Appendix B, 15-16.   
2 State of North Dakota, Department of Emergency Services-Division of Homeland Security, Anchor 
Community & Baseline Equipment Studies, August 2005. 
3 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal:  HSPD-8 Implementation 
Newsletter, July 25, 2005. 
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A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The genesis of a homeland security regional approach began during Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2000 when the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated grant funding to support 
homeland security programs and projects.  North Dakota began its plan for sharing 
equipment and human resources by allocating additional dollars for equipment and 
training strictly to the state’s four largest fire departments.  In return, each of the four 
departments agreed to train and develop mutual aid pacts with smaller fire departments 
within its own particular geographical quadrant.  The plan called for the FY 2001 
allocation to concentrate on larger second tier departments in order to enhance regional 
response capability.  Planning efforts were productive and expectations for success grew 
rapidly.   
However, before the plan was finalized, the director of North Dakota Division of 
Emergency Management unilaterally terminated the effort.  As a lifelong resident of 
North Dakota, he had witnessed the passion and fervor with which the concept of local 
control was defended.  His experience with vehement local response concerning various 
state agency policies and mandates served as the basis for deciding regionalization and 
was a huge political liability.   
Local resentment concerning a number of issues involving emergency 
management and homeland security manifested itself in a dramatic lobbying effort in 
North Dakota producing a media and political firestorm that reached a crescendo in the 
2005 Legislative Session.4  As a result, House Bill 10165 completely reorganized the 
agency, renamed it the Department of Emergency Services (DES) and designated a new 
director. This significantly affected the decision to ascertain levels of local acceptance 
before attempting statewide efforts to plan and implement regionalization.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Insufficient homeland security funding and inequitable distribution formulas have 
created an imbalance in states’ capability to prevent and respond to a CBRNE event.  
State and local jurisdictions have not consistently demanded first responder disciplines 
adopt response protocols that incorporate integration, interoperability and resource 
                                                 
4 State of North Dakota, 59th Legislative Assembly, 2005-2007. 
5 State of North Dakota, 59th Legislative Assembly, 2005-2007, HB 1016, August 26, 2005. 
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sharing through planning, training, and equipment purchases.  All these issues have 
become embroiled in the morass of political maneuvering which adds to confusion when 
attempting to map consistent federal, state and local policy. 
Proponents of a new funding approach hope to strengthen prevention, 
preparedness and response by providing more dollars to urban initiatives.  This is a move 
opponents fear will leave America’s heartland vulnerable to terrorist attack and 
simultaneously provide terrorists easy access to urban populations by exploiting the 
weakest links in the nation’s security system.  
Throughout the nation, homeland security funding impacts 19,429 municipalities, 
16,504 towns or townships, 3,034 counties, 50 states and six territories.6  Proposed 
funding focuses on a few metropolitan areas and benefits a small fraction of these 
jurisdictions.  In the United States, just 60-65 of the 3,034 counties were designated 
Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI) by DHS.7   
Homeland security is contingent upon providing adequate funding to all response 
disciplines throughout the nation.  Cuts to homeland security funding jeopardize 
collaborative efforts already underway.  For example, law enforcement agencies require 
funding for information sharing, target hardening, threat recognition, intervention 
activities and interoperable communications. The proposed prevention funding is 
weighted toward 50 large cities and decreases funding to more than 80 percent of 
America’s suburban and rural law enforcement agencies.  
These cuts make it challenging, if not impossible, for agencies to exchange 
information. Kenneth L. Morckel, Director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety, and 
Todd Wurschmidt, Ph.D., Executive Director, Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police, 
provided compelling testimony for restoration of funding for Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program (LETPP), on April 14, 2005, during a hearing of the Subcommittee 
on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate.  Their  
                                                 
6 U. S. Senate on the Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for 2006.  
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, Kenneth L. Morckel, Director of 
Ohio Department of Public Safety; Todd Wurschmidt, PhD., Executive Director, Ohio Association of 
Chiefs of Police, April 14, 2005. 
7 ibid. 
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testimony stated, “The loss of half a billion from thousands of public safety agencies’ 
budgets will greatly reduce suburban and rural terrorism prevention and first responder 
efforts.” 8   
Morckel and Wurschmidt based their argument for restoring LETPP funding as a 
line item, on preventive measures that have taken place as a result of intelligence sharing, 
including efforts to deter one terrorist bent on blowing up the Brooklyn Bridge prior to 
his capture in rural Ohio during 2003.  This example reinforces arguments that contend 
the fight against terrorism requires all the nation’s 19,000 law enforcement agencies be 
capable of preventing, detecting, deterring and disrupting terrorism.  Morckel and 
Wurschmidt cite a February 2003 quote from President George W. Bush: “We expect 
them to be part of our effort; we must give them the tools necessary so they can do their 
job.”9    
C. FUNDING 
In FY 2004, homeland security funding for North Dakota totaled nearly $20 
million.  This infusion enabled an expanded homeland security program to facilitate, not 
just equipment purchases, but key disaster management programmatic elements including 
exercising, planning, and training.  In addition, the critical role of law enforcement in 
prevention was significantly enhanced through the LETPP.    
In FY 2005, North Dakota’s allocation for the State Homeland Security Grant, 
LETPP, Citizen Corps and the Emergency Management Performance Grant amounted to 
$12,849,748, a $6,571,252 or 34 percent reduction from the previous fiscal year.  In FY 
2006, current estimates threaten a nearly $6 million decrease in the House budget 
committee version and more than a $1 million decrease in the Senate version.10   
                                                 
8 U. S. Senate on the Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for 2006.  
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, Kenneth L. Morckel, Director of 
Ohio Department of Public Safety; Todd Wurschmidt, PhD., Executive Director, Ohio Association of 
Chiefs of Police, April 14, 2005. 
9 Kenneth L. Morckel, Director of Ohio Department of Public Safety; Wurschmidt, Todd, PhD., 
Executive Director, Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police. Statement for the Record, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate on the Appropriations for the 
Department of Homeland Security for 2006. April 14, 2005.  
10 Nolan Jones, A Report from the Homeland Security Advisors Committee of the National Governor’s 
Homeland Security Advisors Conference, National Governor’s Association, Comparison of First 
Responder Grant Legislation, H.R. 1544 and S. 21, June 2005. 
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Reductions are specifically keyed to the State Homeland Security Program and do not 
reflect the decrease in the LETPP, which is earmarked at approximately 25% of the total 
Homeland Security Grant Program.  
Funding has become a premium in North Dakota and further decreases could 
undermine or potentially destroy progress in fully implementing its homeland security 
strategy.  Redistribution of homeland security funding by congress has already lead to 
gaps in protection demonstrated by the following four strategic goals specified in the 
North Dakota Strategic Plan11 for homeland security:   
1. Attain communication interoperability among state and local first responders in 
North Dakota.  The state entered into a contractual obligation with Motorola Corporation 
for communication infrastructure improvements totaling $7 million.  This project allows 
state and local first responders to convert from analog to digital signaling.  Decreased 
funding will severely hamper the ability of state entities and local jurisdictions to 
purchase necessary equipment, which degrades statewide interoperability. 
2. Develop a response capability to ensure accurate deployment of resources by 
the use of the statewide geographic information system (GIS) mapping.  North Dakota 
abandon its efforts to uniformly coordinate GIS mapping for accurate statewide 
deployment of resources. 
3. Improve upon the collection, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of federal, 
state and local homeland security intelligence.  The North Dakota Fusion Center was 
originally staffed by one full-time intelligence officer.  Homeland security funds were 
used to augment planning capability by adding an individual from State Bureau of 
Criminal Investigation and Highway Patrol.  DES has designated a planning position to 
become a permanent member of the Fusion Center team.  Reduced FY 2006 funding will 
curtail staffing. 
 4. Foster sharing of law enforcement sensitive information.  A significant portion 
of homeland security dollars has been invested in North Dakota Criminal Justice 
Information Sharing system.  This complex interactive link between law enforcement and 
the judicial system provides the means for sharing law enforcement sensitive information. 
Homeland security funding will be completely severed for this project. 
                                                 
11 State of North Dakota, Homeland Security Strategic Plan, 2003. 
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D. POPULATION 
There was a 1.3 percent decrease in state population from April 1, 2002 to July 1, 
2003.12  Out migration is a statewide problem but rural areas are encountering a much 
more rapid loss.  The fastest growing segment of the population consists of individuals 85 
years and older.13  Consequently, there is a severe shortage of trained first responders in 
the vast majority of North Dakota.  Lois Hartman, Executive Director of the North 
Dakota Firefighters Association, made the following observation: “As a community ages, 
so do the first responders. Likewise, as people move to larger cities, where there are more 
opportunities for employment, so do first responders.”14   
There are 262 communities consisting 500 people or fewer; only nine have more 
than 10,000 people.  The North Dakota Data Center reports that movement for decades 
by rural residents to larger cities has depopulated much of the state.15  In the last decade, 
population growth has occurred mainly in larger cities and counties with tribal 
governments.  In fact, populations in only six of the state’s 53 counties grew between 
1990 and 2000.16  The long-term trend of net out migration is expected to continue.  
North Dakota tax records between 1998-99 and 2000-01 reveal more wage earners 
moved out-of-state than into North Dakota, resulting in a loss of income.17  Facing both 
external and internal financial constraints in concert with a population reduction, North 
Dakota’s 350 rural communities simply lack capability to build a capability for response 
to numerous vulnerabilities. 
This is not simply a North Dakota problem.  According to a survey conducted by 
the National League of Cities, less than 40 percent of cities with a population of 10,000  
                                                 
12 North Dakota State Data Center, North Dakota State University, North Dakota Population 
Projections: 2005 to 2020, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.  September 2002. 
13 Telephone conversation between Tom Decker, North Dakota Public Instruction and the author, 5 
July 2005. 
14 Lois Hartman, North Dakota Firefighter’s Association, Telephone conversation between Lois 
Hartman and the author, November 2004. 
15 North Dakota State Data Center, North Dakota State University, North Dakota Population 




or fewer have a terrorism plan in place.  Many local jurisdictions, especially small 
metropolitan and rural communities, lack manpower, expertise and resources to develop a 
comprehensive emergency response plan.18   
E. VULNERABILITIES 
It may be credibly argued states with larger populations are at greater risk.  
However, North Dakota possesses several significant risk factors that affect the entire 
nation. With a population density slightly exceeding nine people per square mile and 
much lower in rural areas (fewer than one person per square mile in Slope County),19 
North Dakota is extremely vulnerable.  
The most apparent vulnerability stems from the 319-mile border with Canada 
located along eight sparsely populated rural counties.   Literally thousands of unprotected 
access points creates an ideal port of entry for terrorists who can take advantage of an 
easy-to-disappear-in environment to bring plans, resources and materials needed to 
conduct immediate operations or proceed undetected to more high value targets.  Amtrak 
serves the state with two long-distance east/west daily trains and follows a route from 
Chicago-Minneapolis/St. Paul through North Dakota to Seattle/Portland.  Six Amtrak 
stations are located along the northern portion of the state and could provide an easy 
means of conveyance to metropolitan areas.20 
Minot and Grand Forks Air Force Bases represent a large military presence. Both 
installations have participated in bombing and logistical support campaigns against 
terrorist organizations and the countries that sponsor them. Minot Air Force Base also 
houses Intercontinental Ballistics Missiles that are dispersed strategically throughout 
North Dakota.21  It is also home to nuclear capable B-52 bombers. 
North Dakota has vast reserves of coal; that resource is used to generate power to 
grids in all or part of seven states and southern Canada.  At least two thirds of 
                                                 
18 National Association of Development Organizations.  Homeland Security and Regional Councils: 
Building Local Capacity at the Regional Level.  2004. 
19 North Dakota State Data Center, North Dakota State University, North Dakota Population 
Projections: 2005 to 2020, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.  September 2002. 
20Amtrak, 
http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/Page/Routes_Index_Page&c=Page&cid
=1080072922209&ssid=4, accessed August 27, 2005. 
21 North Dakota Division of Emergency Management, Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy 
Program, 2003. 
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Minnesota’s power is generated and transmitted from plants in North Dakota.  According 
to the production manager of The Falkirk Mining Company, three generation stations in 
North Dakota provide major distribution points to areas outside the state.  Disruption 
would ensue if multiple transmission lines were compromised.  “The lines don’t have to 
be in an urban area to cause major disruption.”22 
There are oil reserves in the western part of the state and a large refinery located 
in the south central section.  Refined oil products move though pipelines in North Dakota 
to 12 states.  Natural gas produced in North Dakota and Canada travels to several states; 
the Chicago region is a recipient.  The only synthetic fuels plant in the nation is located in 
North Dakota. It processes more than 6 million tons of coal each year to produce more 
than 54 billion standard cubic feet of natural gas annually plus several other products 
including anhydrous ammonia used to make fertilizer, a component in certain types of 
bombs.  
The state also possesses an enormous agricultural infrastructure that could easily 
be targeted through delivery of biochemical agents or vectors.  Introduction of a plant or 
foreign animal disease, especially one that was zoonotic, would result not only in world 
economic chaos but also in a human health crisis. 
F. INDEPENDENT ATTITUDES 
Local control is a political ideal held sacred in North Dakota and regionalization 
conjures fear of losing decision-making power and influence.  Local, tribal and state 
authorities still maintain certain parochial attitudes and embrace the concept of sharing 
human and equipment resources when it benefits individual interests.  Independent 
attitudes within small communities have and will continue blocking cooperative efforts to 
achieve common goals.  However, in recent years, out migration and the agricultural 
economy have eroded human and financial resources to a point that some communities 
have concluded continued existence requires a transition toward human, equipment and 
financial resource sharing as demonstrated by consolidation of fire, ambulance and 
educational services.   
Currently, the state’s 53 counties act in their own interest as self-contained, stove-
piped entities.  Past purchases of equipment through ODP resemble an unassembled 
                                                 
22 Randy Crooke, The Falkirk Mining Company, Washburn, North Dakota, Telephone conversation 
between Randy Crooks and the author,  August 27, 2005. 
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puzzle.  Pieces of needed equipment are scattered throughout several communities while 
coordination required to assemble an effective response is lacking.  Because there is no 
current standardized equipment procurement system, mistakes have occurred, 
exemplified by one western North Dakota fire department’s purchase of equipment no 
one was qualified to operate.  
G. POLITICAL 
Blistering commentaries by politicians and media concerning purchases of “boots, 
suits, and robots”23 regarding past allocations of homeland security funding underscore 
the need for such guidance.  The city of Grand Forks, North Dakota came under heavy 
fire by media outlets, in USA Today and Boston Globe articles for its purchases of a semi-
armored van, decontamination tents, a bomb-detecting robot and bomb suit.  The same 
USA Today article also quoted a Zanesville, Ohio, hazardous materials coordinator as 
saying, “It’s better than Christmas.”24  These comments give the appearance of 
haphazard and cavalier attitudes regarding equipment purchases.  Representative 
Christopher Cox, R-California, chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, 
includes such articles showing these attitudes on his website25 to buttress the argument 
that funding should be directed to more heavily populated areas by virtue of the greater 
perceived risk.   
An effective public counter argument has never been offered.  However, in a 
critical situation involving an arsenal of explosives and a running gun battle, it took three 
hours for the state’s only bomb robot to arrive.  Grand Forks County Emergency 
Manager Jim Campbell echoed the feelings of most North Dakotans when he said, “The 
citizens of North Dakota deserve the same protection as any other citizen of any other 
state.”26 
                                                 
23 Wayne Baron, North Dakota Division of Homeland Security, Telephone conversation between 
Wayne Baron and the author, January 15, 2005. 
24 USA Today, October 23, 2003, available at https://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-10-
29-security-cover-usat_x.htm, accessed July 29, 2005. 
25 Christopher Cox, available at http://homelandsecurity.house.gov/coverage.cfm?id=105, accessed 
July 29, 2005. 
26 Brian Macquarrie, Urban Regions Fight Security Funds Formula, The Boston Globe, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/03/21/urban_regions_fight_security_funds_formula/?rss
_id=Boston%20Globe%20--%20National%20News, accessed March 22, 2005. 
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Although the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has produced 
authorized lists of equipment for local jurisdictions, it has not provided specific lists of 
equipment necessary for different capability levels within various response disciplines.  
Hence, choice of equipment often fulfills a wish list based upon wants, rather than needs.  
This problem has been responsible for claims that the Homeland Security Grant Program 
has resulted in “toys for boys”27 and a sense of entitlement when ordering equipment.  
Reduced homeland security grant money will further compound difficulty in purchasing 
necessary equipment. 
H. EQUIPMENT PURCHASING CONFUSION 
 The equipment list provided by DHS evolved from a categorical list of fewer than 
50 items to a complex web-based system containing hundreds of qualifying items.  Small, 
volunteer first responder departments do not possess the expertise or time to fully 
research all equipment options available for procurement.  DES, along with a myriad 
number of other states, has received numerous requests from first responders for 
guidance in purchasing decisions but DHS has not provided a specific authorized list of 
equipment necessary to different capability levels within various response disciplines.   
 Though national initiatives are currently pursuing development of a Universal 
Task List (UTL)28 and Target Capabilities List (TCL)29 based on a series of national 
planning scenarios that eventually link specific equipment by WMD response level, the 
process has been slow to ground final products with local first responders. 
In summary, the inability to achieve an adequate level of federal funding to meet 
strategic goals within the state homeland security strategy is a serious problem 
encountered by North Dakota as well as other states in developing a comprehensive 
homeland security prevention, preparedness and response capability. Independent 
attitudes, often a key ingredient for survival in a rural environment, fail to foster the 
cooperation necessary to create the most efficient use of available resources.  These 
                                                 
27 Wayne Baron, North Dakota Division of Homeland Security, Telephone conversation between 
Wayne Baron and the author, January 15 2005. 
28 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Universal Task List, 
July 30, 2004. 
29 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness, Target Capabilities List, Version 1.1, May 23, 2005. 
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challenges will prove difficult to overcome due to a lack of professional response 
personnel, with limited resources, literally spread over thousands of square miles. 
North Dakota utilized the Statewide Template Initiative30 supported by the federal 
Homeland Security Advisory Council, and outlined in the document, National Strategy 
for Homeland Security31 for the development of a comprehensive strategy encouraging 
citizen participation in the Homeland Security preparedness effort32 and following the 
supporting standards designated in Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8.33   
I. SOLUTION 
One of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) overarching national 
priorities is to expand regionalization.  The National Preparedness Guidance, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8:  National Preparedness, states, “As we develop 
Federal assistance programs in FY 2006 and beyond, our focus will be to leverage our 
homeland security resources in order to achieve the highest possible readiness.”34   
 Upon introspection, the major impediment in implementing a regional tiered 
prevention, preparedness and response capability has been lack of initiative. Clearly, it is 
time to overcome inertia and leverage resources to build a process in which all 
stakeholders throughout the state are consulted and asked to collaborate in helping design 
a statewide regional plan to build a comprehensive homeland security prevention and 
response strategy.  
To begin the regionalization process, North Dakota implemented the Anchor 
Community study35 to determine acceptance levels for a statewide regional approach 
based upon jurisdictional resource sharing that ensures a tiered capability to effectively 
plan for, prevent and respond to a CBRNE event.  Anchor communities are defined as 
                                                 
30 President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, Statewide Template Initiative, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Statewide_Template_Initiative.pdf, accessed June 29, 2005. 
31 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July, 2002. 
32 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Guiding Principles of Homeland Security Studies, available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSAC_GuidingPrinciplesHSStudies_1204.pdf, accessed June 
29, 2005. 
33 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, December 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html, accessed June 29, 2005. 
34 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8:  National Preparedness.  April 27, 2005. 
35 State of North Dakota, Department of Emergency Services-Division of Homeland Security, Anchor 
Community and Baseline Equipment Studies, August 2005. 
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entities that facilitate statewide sharing of resources, including personnel, equipment, 
training, exercising and planning.  A Baseline Equipment Capability study36 conducted in 
concert with the Anchor Community study will produce a document containing lists of 
specific equipment aligned with the four levels of WMD capability for specific response 
disciplines including private and public health, hazardous materials (hazmat), fire, law 
enforcement, emergency medical services (EMS), public works, emergency management, 
administration, and public safety communications.  Equipment tailored to various 
jurisdictional capabilities promotes consistency, efficiency and interoperability when 
planning and developing protocols involved in tiered regional response. 
Capability, as defined by a draft discussion paper, Thinking About National 
Preparedness: The National Planning Scenarios and Jurisdictional Own-source 
Capabilities, is “the potential or actual application of skills and equipment to achieve an 
operational effect.”37  An anchor community can be thought of as a capability center that 
serves as a catalyst to achieve integrated and interoperable resources sharing within a 
capability cluster or region.  Determining various capability levels establishes a method 
to develop appropriate protocols for a tiered response.  By providing baseline equipment 
lists for the four WMD capability levels, appropriate equipment can be purchased for 
individual disciplines and applied to specified protocols to achieve the desired 
operational effect. 
Establishing the consensus for a structured response based upon tiered capability 
levels can be contentious.  Regionalization, accomplished through anchor communities, 
implements a process in which response disciplines and jurisdictions are forced to 
accurately assess capability levels in order to plan integrated response protocols.  The 
Baseline Equipment Capability study is an integral part of the Anchor Community 
regional concept.  When used in conjunction with the regional capability assessment, it 
affords insight into actual levels of capability, which reduces false perceptions.  The 
equipment lists serve as specific guidelines and will help stakeholders reach consensus 
concerning decisions to fund different types and amount of equipment and training. 
                                                 
36 State of North Dakota, Department of Emergency Services-Division of Homeland Security, Anchor 
Community and Baseline Equipment Studies, August 2005. 
37 Homeland Security Institute, Thinking About National Preparedness: The National Planning 
Scenarios and Jurisdictional Own-source Capabilities, 2005. 
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Efforts to develop a baseline equipment list, with insight and direction from first 
responders and community leaders, coincide with recent efforts by DHS to develop a 
Target Capabilities List38 that will measure whether, the nation, drawing upon federal, 
state, local, tribal, private sector and non-governmental organizations, is prepared for an 
incident of national significance.  These capabilities are based upon the National 
Response Plan (NRP)39 and associated critical tasks from the Universal Task List,40 as 
well as the list’s performance measures and capability elements that include personnel, 
planning, organization and leadership, equipment and systems, training and exercises, 
evaluations and corrective actions.  
Like the Baseline Equipment Capability study, DHS used a similar vetting 
process to draw upon the insights of subject matter experts for refinements to its Target 
Capabilities List.  DHS organizes stakeholders in discipline-specific work groups to 
establish target levels for the nation and apportion responsibility to develop and maintain 
those levels among all jurisdictions.41  The Baseline Equipment Capability study will 
complement these efforts by specifically identifying resources necessary to perform the 
tasks at various levels of capability.   
At the outset, North Dakota’s four largest cities appear to be considered anchor 
communities due to the amount of human and equipment resources available.  However, 
when data such as response times and individual jurisdictional capability are gathered and 
analyzed, other communities may be considered anchors.  For example, the small 
community of Beulah, population 3,152, relies on a world-class hazmat team located 
nearby at the nation’s only synthetic fuels production plant.  This type of capability will 
certainly be factored into a regional sharing model. 
J. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis specifically addresses the process of building the foundation for a 
regional approach through a coordinated effort of utilizing local, state, federal and private 
                                                 
38 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness, Target Capabilities List, Version 1.1, May 23, 2005. 
39 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004. 
40 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Universal Task List, 
July 30, 2004. 
41 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal:  HSPD-8 Implementation 
Newsletter, July 25, 2005. 
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sector stakeholders.  Although regional approaches implemented by others are outlined, 
none explain the actual process used to develop the approach.  The first phase in 
implementing a regional approach is determining acceptance.   
Chapter one explains rural states, such as North Dakota, face reductions in 
homeland security funding, increasing vulnerability to terrorist activities and disrupting 
progress in implementing homeland security strategies and underscores the need for state, 
local and tribal authorities examine methods to enhance their capabilities to develop 
protocols for sharing resources.   
The second chapter, Crossing Jurisdictional Boundaries, delves into an 
examination of regional approaches and application by other states.  A review of the 
approaches includes a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
which described various federal agency programs that provide funding allocations based 
upon regional coordination.  Additionally, the chapter discusses findings by the National 
Emergency Management Association (NEMA) regarding use of regional approaches to 
homeland security funding. 
Chapter three, Building a Process, focuses on determining the level of acceptance 
for the Anchor Community regional approach and Baseline Equipment Capability study.  
Ultimately, the study will answer two questions asked North Dakota first responders who 
grapple with preparing for and preventing a terrorist attack:  What is needed for response 
at all levels, and how will a community sustain its capability? 
In Chapter four, lessons learned from the process to gain a level acceptability for 
moving forward with a regional approach are highlighted. 
Chapter five discusses benefits derived by jurisdictions through a regional 
approach and concludes by establishing considerations when moving forward with the 
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II. CROSSING JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES 
A. DIFFICULT TASK 
In the September 2004, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 
outlined examples of various federal agency programs that provide allocation of funds 
based upon regional coordination.  It supports the Cox-Turner Bill, which provides 
funding for regional grant applications that coordinate closely with state homeland 
security strategic plans.  One of the main conclusions states, “…regional approaches to 
manage federal homeland security dollars help to ensure that those funds are spent [in a 
manner] that is targeted at known security gaps.”42   
However, the report realistically points out inherent difficulty in seeking solutions 
through regionalization:  
Historically, the American governance system, divided into federal, state 
and local jurisdictions, does not provide a natural vehicle for discussing 
public policy issues from a regional, multi-jurisdictional perspective. The 
autonomy of local jurisdictions and competing priorities within and among 
them makes regional coordination difficult. Efforts that seek to overcome 
these challenges to coordinate regionally must take into account the 
different operational structures and civic traditions of states and 
municipalities.43  
In fact, supporters of the current system maintain that which is not broken should 
not be fixed.  Although some concern has been expressed, the vast majority of local 
officials have not complained about the state’s homeland security funding formula only 
the implementation rules and regulations established by DHS and enforced by DES.  
Some have indicated language in North Dakota Senate Bill 215144 provides for a 
statewide umbrella memorandum of understanding to address most common problems 
encountered in resource sharing and creates a simple, convenient method by which 
jurisdictions can initiate the process.   Others argue a majority of citizens in North Dakota 
reside in cities and counties with resources and memorandums of understanding in place 
                                                 
42 Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, (GAO-04-1009 
Homeland Security, September 2004). 
43 ibid. 
44 State of North Dakota, 59th Legislative Assembly, 2005-2007, HB 2151, April 26, 2005. 
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to adequately respond to perceived risks.   There are people who believe the North 
Dakota’s fledgling Civil Support Team (NDCST), once operational, should be able to 
provide the necessary response for the state’s perceived low risk environment.  
Instead of a disorganized approach to form partnerships, the Anchor Community 
regional concept encompassing equipment needs tied to capability will ensure a tiered 
resource sharing capability to respond using agreed upon protocols involving various 
jurisdictional and response disciplines.  In contrast to the more independent and isolated 
process currently in use, the Anchor Community concept provides for necessary 
coordinated planning, training, and exercising activities between and among disciplines 
and jurisdictions required to implement a comprehensive approach for sharing resources 
that is integrated and interoperable.  Therefore, region-to-region partnerships will be 
more easily formalized affording execution of a statewide comprehensive response effort 
geared for all North Dakota citizens not just a majority.  Regionalization will promote 
strong coordination with NDCST protocols as opposed to using only National Guard 
resources for response.   
B. REVIEW OF REGIONALIZATION 
The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) queried its members 
regarding targeting homeland security funding to regional approaches.  Few states 
responded but each indicated allocations for planning, equipment, training and exercises 
are based upon a regional approach.45  For example, Arizona is divided into five 
homeland security regional advisory councils.  The state hired five planners to assist each 
region with operations and grant administration.  Colorado is sectioned into nine regions 
and, in an attempt to foster agency cooperation and ensure equipment operability, 
required a collaborative effort to submit one combined application for funding.  Delaware 
officials consider the state one region for Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) 
funding. Kentucky has 14 state emergency management regions each with a 
WMD/hazmat team, which receives funding to purchase detection and response 
equipment.  Counties/cities are able to direct local allocations toward building general 
response capabilities. Tennessee officials have placed 95 counties into 11 homeland 
security districts, which align with the economic development districts.  Each district has 
                                                 
45 National Emergency Management Association, Email survey sent to all State Homeland Security 
Directors, June 2004. 
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a Homeland Security Council comprised of the various emergency response disciplines, 
medical and law enforcement as well as elected officials. Utah used the recommendation 
of the State ODP Advisory Board to establish seven regions based upon predetermined 
emergency response times and distance. Within the state of Washington, each of the nine 
regions contains a single county emergency management office designated as the 
Homeland Security Regional Coordinating Office (HSRCO).  HSRCOs provide a central 
vetting mechanism for achieving regional consensus among the other emergency 
management offices and responder disciplines within respective counties, cities and 
tribes.  West Virginia allocates funding to its six response regions based upon a number 
of factors including population density, threat analysis and equipment shortfalls.  Groups 
representing law enforcement, emergency medical services and fire provide input 
concerning equipment selection, training and planning requirements.  
In 2003, the Centre Region COG (State College Borough, College, Ferguson, 
Halfmoon, Harris, and Patton Townships) in Pennsylvania implemented a regional 
concept for enhancing emergency management capacities in a cost-effective manner. The 
municipalities adopted a single emergency management plan, designated a shared 
operations center, and hire an emergency management coordinator.46   
The national capital regional compact illustrates that federal, state and local 
jurisdictions recognize the need to share resources based upon varied levels of capability.  
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) is composed of 19 local 
governments surrounding the nation’s capital, plus area members of the Maryland and 
Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives.  After 
September 11, 2001, COG developed plans to ensure a coordinated response to terrorist 
threats and attacks.  The jurisdictions developed a Regional Emergency Coordination 
Plan (RECP) for collaboration in planning, communication, information sharing, and 
coordination activities before, during, or after a regional emergency.47 
In Texas, regional councils have provided an environment that is less parochial, 
unbiased, apolitical, and therefore, capable of analyzing regional threats and needs on the 
                                                 
46 Centre Region Council of Governments, State College Pennsylvania “Working Together to Improve 
Emergency Management,” available at http://cog.centreconnect.org/emer-mgmt/, accessed January 7, 2005. 
47 Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, Regional Emergency Coordination Plan, 
available at http://www.mwcog.org/security/security/plan.asp, accessed January 7, 2005. 
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merits and facts alone.  This is more efficient and cost-effective than establishing new 
regional partnerships or allowing local jurisdictions to plan and act individually.48   
As stated in the Wirthlin Report (September-October 2002), the majority of local 
governments have made only modest or no changes to emergency response plans since 
September 2001.  The most common obstacles cited, include political and turf battles;  
lack of training, equipment and technology; and limited assistance for planning.  As 
regional planning organizations, regional councils have the professional staff, planning 
tools and background necessary to address and overcome these obstacles.49 
Local homeland security funding in North Dakota is currently allocated through 
local and tribal emergency managers who coordinate meetings in which first responding 
disciplines within each of the 53 counties form consensus for utilizing allocations.  State 
homeland security funding received by each county is determined by a formula that 
incorporates proximity to the border, population, risk and vulnerability assessments 
(including agriculture), primary threat elements, legal hazards, full time emergency 
response personnel, and specialized teams (bomb and hazmat).  Although various forms 
of regionalization (Department of Transportation, Highway Patrol, Health Department, 
and Bomb) exist in North Dakota, all have been established to provide an outside service 
to local entities.  None have a responsibility to provide funding allocations to local 
jurisdictions, which control planning, equipment purchases and operational decision 
making nor were the regions planned using stakeholder input.  Therefore, it was decided 
to design a regional homeland security program from a grassroots perspective but 





                                                 
48 Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, Regional Emergency Coordination Plan. 
http://www.mwcog.org/security/security/plan.asp, accessed January 7, 2005. 
49 National Association of Development Organizations.  Homeland Security and Regional Councils: 
Building Local Capacity at the Regional Level.  2004. 
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III. BUILDING A PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In its final report, the 9/11 Commission indicated first responders today live in a 
world transformed by the attacks on September 11, 2001. Commission members stated a 
“rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we 
lost that day.”50    
What is needed for response at all levels, and how will a community sustain its 
capability are the two main questions asked by North Dakota first responders who 
grapple with preparing for and preventing a terrorist attack.  
Recognizing future decreases in homeland security funding and changing 
program initiatives, DES conducted a brainstorming session focused upon quality project 
development for FY 2005, which resulted in a two-day scoping meeting held December 
2004.  The planning group consisted of representatives from DHS, and North Dakota 
Highway Patrol (HP), North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) and DES.  
Ideas generated during the session resulted in the Anchor Community study and Baseline 
Equipment Capability study that in concert would form the basis for initiating acceptance 
and ultimately implementation of the North Dakota regional approach.  The group 
determined acceptance for a regional approach could be gained only if the assessment 
and initiatives had local origin and buy-in from a working group representing the four 
major cities/counties of Fargo/Cass, Bismarck/Burleigh, Grand Forks/Grand Forks, and 
Minot/Ward.  Although these entities would not automatically be considered anchor 
communities, the four possess the greatest capability to provide technical planning and 
exercise expertise as well as advanced equipment to support other jurisdictions. 
Local and tribal emergency managers were briefed concerning the proposed study 
initiatives at the DES Annual Workshop in late January 2005.  In early March 2005, a 
meeting was held with the four city/county emergency managers to describe the studies 
and receive input.  Each entity received an additional $50,000 in FY 2005 homeland 
security planning funds to conduct the studies.  Cass County opted to implement the 
                                                 
50 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8:  National Preparedness.  April 27, 2005. 
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study by designating the Fargo emergency manager to conduct an individual county-by-
county assessment in the southeastern portion of North Dakota.  Grand Forks, Burleigh 
and Ward Counties collectively agreed, due to time constraints, to pool resources by 
contracting services through the North Dakota League of Cities and Association of 
Counties (NDLC) to coordinate completion of the project in all other areas of the state. 
During April 2005, DES met with the contractor from NDLC and the Fargo 
emergency manager on several occasions to discuss coordination of meetings with focus 
groups comprised of representatives of response disciplines, public officials, and the 
private sector.  Both were asked to develop a single set of questions designed to stimulate 
discussion concerning implementation of the regional approach and a questionnaire or 
survey that would gauge levels of acceptance.  Guidelines were also formulated for the 
Baseline Equipment Capability study.  Subject matter experts (SMEs) in the areas of 
private and public health, fire/hazmat, law enforcement, EMS, public works, emergency 
management/administration, public safety communications and agriculture were selected.  
Each subject matter expert reviewed the 2005 DHS Authorized Equipment List, DHS 
Target Capabilities and Universal Task Lists, and then compiled a list of equipment for 
the specific discipline matched to the four-response capability levels defined in the State 
Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program Jurisdiction Handbook.51   Fire 
and hazmat SMEs also used National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards,52 
which included:  NFPA 471, Responding to Hazmat Incidents; NFPA 472, Professional 
Competence of Hazmat Responders; NFPA 1991, Vapor Protective PPE for Hazmat 
Response; NFPA 1994, PPE for Chem/Bio Terrorist Incidents; NFPA 1999, PPE for 
Emergency Medical Operations; NFPA 1670, Operations & Training for Technical 
Rescue Incidents.  Each SME was responsible for vetting the equipment list with the state 
associations representing each particular discipline.   
In the latter part of April 2005, DES invited all emergency managers to homeland 
security briefings scheduled throughout the state and as part of the agenda, explained the 
relevance of the initiative.  Because the four cities and counties in which each is located 
                                                 
51 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, State Homeland 
Security Assessment and Strategy Program Jurisdiction Handbook. 
52 National Fire Protection Association Codes and Standards, available at 
http://www.nfpa.org/categoryList.asp?categoryID=124&URL=Codes%20and%20Standards, accessed 
August 6, 2005. 
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normally garner more state and federal funds, there is often an element of resentment 
displayed by smaller jurisdictions.  However, there was no negative feedback during the 
meeting. 
In early May 2005, DES and the two contractors refined focus group discussion 
and survey questions, which were vetted during several meetings with local and tribal 
emergency managers.  In late May 2005, the contractors and DES personnel briefed BCI, 
HP, NDCST and the North Dakota Health Department to obtain input regarding the 
action plan. 
On June 1, 2005, DES and the coordinators finalized the action plan for the 
Anchor Community study, which included the final presentation, discussion questions 
and survey. 
Potential participants were selected based upon the response disciplines 
established by DHS:  Fire/hazmat, law enforcement, healthcare, public health, emergency 
management, administration, public works, public safety communications, and 
emergency medical services.  A total of 1,675 invitational letters were sent to county 
commission chairs, county auditors, county emergency managers, county sheriffs, county 
highway superintendents, county health representatives, city mayors, city auditors, city 
administrators, city police chiefs, city public works directors, city and rural fire chiefs, 
emergency services, ambulance directors, regional bioterrorism coordinators and tribal 
governments.   
Local and tribal emergency managers determined evening meetings would ensure 
better participation since many attendees would be volunteers.  However, two counties 
opted to hold focus groups in the afternoon since there was a more even mixture of full 
time and volunteer participants. 
Seventeen focus group meetings were conducted throughout the state from June 
22 through July 13.  The NDLC contractor conducted six meetings in the northeast 
(Grand Forks, Devil’s Lake), northwest (Minot, Williston), and southwest (Bismarck, 
Dickinson) corners of the state. The Fargo emergency manager conducted meetings in 
eleven of 13 counties (Barnes, Sargent, Lamoure, Stutsman, Richland, McIntosh, Traill, 
Ransom, Logan, Steele, and Cass Counties) comprising the southeast corner of the state.  
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Dickey and Griggs counties encountered emergencies, which precluded representatives 
from participating.  Two hundred twenty-eight people attended the focus groups 
meetings. 
The same presentation, questions, and surveys were used in each focus group. All 
meetings began with a presentation that explained the purpose of the study, the definition 
of anchor communities, the correlation between the universal task list and the anchor 
community concept, an explanation of the WMD response level definitions, and finally, 
the jurisdictional roles and responsibilities contained within the anchor community 
concept.  
Following the presentation, questions were used to generate thoughts, ideas and 
discussion concerning homeland security and the Anchor Community concept as a 
potential solution to a regional approach in North Dakota.   
B. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The most common gap identified related to lack of personnel, equipment, and 
funding, especially in rural areas, to effectively respond to a large incident involving 
hazardous materials.  Issues of training and exercise were addressed by targeting anchor 
communities with the responsibility.  Volunteer participants, due to financial and time 
constraints, believed anchor communities should be required to travel to jurisdictions to 
provide technical expertise for training and exercise.  Participants believed there was a 
need for a more streamlined process to request resources.  People indicated there is still 
confusion about responsibility for reimbursement of logistical expenses involving food, 
lodging, salaries and equipment when multiple agencies respond. 
The state homeland security program was thought to lack good organization and 
planning.  Some responders expressed concern that EMS had been omitted from the 
process.   
Poor cell phone and radio reception in rural areas were identified.  In many 
instances, there is absolutely no reception and in others, clarity is poor.  In addition, not 
all communication frequencies are available throughout the state.  In some jurisdictions, 
the state radio channel is unavailable, so responders must resort to using cell phones; if 
there is service. 
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The majority of respondents expressed that an anchor community system would 
promote resources sharing and could be the vehicle to reduce or eliminate the amount of 
paperwork required when requesting assistance from other jurisdictions and confusion 
about the points of contact when assistance is required.  Feedback indicated a tiered, 
regional response system would help create a database of resources in the state; those 
from rural jurisdictions expressed it would be especially helpful for them to know the 
type and location of resources available.  EMS personnel explained a tiered, regional 
response system would be the only method by which they could respond to a large 
incident.   
A majority of the rural responders were concerned a regional system would create 
“haves” and “have nots”.  They recognized the necessity of having resources available to 
assist them in response, but strongly noted the need for continued homeland security 
funding in order to be able to provide appropriate initial response. 
One to two hour response time was acceptable.  Several indicated the initial or 
“evaluation team” should be able to respond within an hour.  Responders from larger 
communities stated an advance team, depending upon the incident, could be enroute 
within 15-30 minutes.  Others indicated conjecture concerning response time was 
somewhat irrelevant considering environmental conditions such as blizzards and severe 
cold. 
The major requirement for an anchor community was keyed to full-time response 
discipline departments with a WMD performance offensive or advanced operation and 
technician capability levels to ensure an effective response to a CBRNE event.  It was 
universally agreed upon that an anchor community must have the resources necessary to 
purchase equipment and sustain training and exercise, along with a commitment to 
respond to surrounding jurisdictions if homeland security funding is significantly 
curtailed or discontinued.  It was deemed important that anchor communities should also 
have a local, operational 911 system.  It was considered critical that the community have 
a hospital and an EMS capability certified as advanced life support (ALS). 
Because Bismarck, Fargo, Grand Forks and Minot are considered performance 
offensive or advanced operations and technician level, there was support for those cities 
to serve as most technical tier of support.  It was suggested Devils Lake, Dickinson, 
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Jamestown and Williston due to performance defensive level capabilities should form a 
secondary tier.  In several groups, there was mention that the anchor community system 
should follow the statewide Special Weapons and Tactical (SWAT) team response plan.  
In reality, the SWAT plan has not yet been fully implemented.  Discussion revealed that 
some rural areas possess a higher degree of capability than larger communities do and 
that the anchor community process must include this formulating tiered response 
protocols. 
Responders stated anchor communities need to train and exercise with the smaller 
jurisdictions both individually and in the regional setting to ensure common protocols are 
agreed upon, understood and practiced by all jurisdictions.  Volunteer participants, due to 
financial and time constraints, believed anchor communities should be required to travel 
to jurisdictions to conduct training and exercises. 
Ninety percent of respondents believe the anchor community approach would 
accommodate human and resource sharing.  Eighty-seven percent indicated anchor 
communities afforded more effective planning opportunities and will benefit local 
jurisdictions.  Eighty-five percent thought anchor communities would accommodate 
development of a comprehensive statewide homeland security strategic plan.  Eighty-one 
percent believed the approach would benefit respective response disciplines.  Seventy-
eight percent indicated anchor communities would lead to a more efficient method of 
equipment distribution. 
It is apparent a high percentage of participants supported tiered resource sharing.  
In North Dakota, a majority of individuals who are skeptical and display a definite 
tendency to distrust motives behind ideas and processes to implement change 
traditionally attend focus meetings of this type involving shifts in policy affecting 
jurisdictional funding.  When participation is low, normally there is a preponderance of 
negativity.  Therefore, the extremely high number of participants in agreement or strong 
agreement was somewhat surprising. 
One question that garnered less than 80 percent; 78 percent agreed and strongly 
agreed that anchor communities would accommodate a more efficient method of 
equipment distribution.  The reason may lie in the fact that more concern was raised  
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when contemplating how individual equipment purchases may be affected when 
capability levels are evaluated and determined in a regional process and not arbitrarily 
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IV.  LESSONS LEARNED 
The need for interoperability requires state, local and tribal emergency operations 
plan protocols be aligned to reflect standards and procedures established by the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP).  Mutual 
aid agreements and memorandums of understanding that address interoperability will be 
important for continuity of response.  Those agreements must take into account non-
governmental organizations to ensure a broader capability. 
Results of the process used to determine acceptance levels revealed the need to 
change certain methods if afforded the opportunity to proceed with the implementation 
phase.  The benefits of expanding the invitee list will be studied, and will include RSVP 
requests.  In addition to written invitations, multi-media sources will be employed to 
encourage participation.  There will be a concerted effort to schedule meetings in late fall 
or during winter; late spring, summers and early fall often preclude farmer and ranchers.  
Future survey questions will be validated using university resources or private enterprise 
because more detailed statistical analysis will be necessary.    
The decision to hire two independent contractors provided objectivity during 
focus group meetings.  Without the presence of DES staff, participants could engage in 
honest, open dialog in discussing challenges facing North Dakota and viable solutions   
relating to regionalization. 
The studies’ results will provide the information necessary to assist DES with 
recommendations for future action, for building anchor communities and refinement of 
tiered equipment lists.  In a time when limited funding inhibits the ability to effectively 
respond to an incident, the studies set the foundation for a strategic direction in adjusting 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Grassroots acceptance for the anchor community regionalization approach was 
overwhelming.  Individuals at the local level realize regionalization is the most effective 
method for coordinating shared response efforts, equipment purchases as well as multi-
jurisdictional training and exercising.  This is extremely positive; regional 
implementation is a DHS national priority and the homeland security funding distribution 
formula may exclude a portion of the allocation to states that have not begun the process.  
North Dakota now has an opportunity to collaborate with local and tribal jurisdictions 
and response disciplines to move forward in planning regional implementation based 
upon the anchor community concept.  A regional approach will deliver a more 
comprehensive needs and risk assessment as opposed to a myopic analysis limited by 
jurisdictional boundaries.  This leads responders to realistically perceive funding 
priorities.  Regionalization is pivotal in developing a comprehensive homeland security 
program strategy that incorporates both prevention and response. 
Baseline equipment lists standardized for capability levels provide specific 
guidance, direction and clarity for equipment purchasing decisions and circumvents the 
complex and disjointed method currently in use.  The lists forces first responders to 
honestly assess capability and will help achieve jurisdictional consensus in planning a 
tiered response.  This is extremely important considering meeting participants indicated 
69 percent of jurisdictions were at the awareness capability level. 
The anchor community and its use of the baseline equipment lists specifically 
targets funding allocations predicated upon capability.  Smaller jurisdictions were able to 
compare services available through regionalization to the amount and type each could 
provide citizens without an organized resource sharing process.  It appears jurisdictions 
realize the significant benefit an anchor community provides in establishing an umbrella 
memorandum of understanding that delineates responsibilities and protocols, thereby, 
streamlines procedures for resources requests and eliminates confusion involved with 
logistical reimbursement.  The high rate of acceptance indicates jurisdictions supported 
greater funding streams for larger entities because the tiered response returned  
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considerably more value than could be obtained from planning reasons protocols and 
equipment purchased in isolation.  Regionalization can be interpreted as a force 
multiplier that delivers economy of scale. 
While such assessments offer insights into a specific jurisdiction, an assessment 
of an area, or region, as a whole will provide a less myopic view and will outline the 
needs and capabilities for the region and the state.  This perspective will enable such 
states as North Dakota to earmark limited funding efficiently to areas most needed.  A 
broader based assessment will also lead to more selective purchases of equipment, and 
identify training and exercising necessary to sustain response capabilities.  An assessment 
of a region’s baseline capabilities will give first responders and communities a 
perspective on what they can feasibly accomplish in their jurisdictions and whether they 
are capable of preventing, preparing or responding to a WMD event.  Assessments will 
provide the foundation for planning, training and exercising; they increase efficiency and 
effectiveness by providing tiered resources. 
Themes evolving from responder input in North Dakota mirror those expressed 
through the nation.  It was important that regionalization ensure the same training and 
exercising is shared with all jurisdictions to provide more efficient and effectives process 
integration and coordination in response, logistic, and communication protocols as well 
as equipment purchases.  Improving interoperable communications problems was a key 
issue anchor communities were expected to solve. 
This study will be distributed to first responders, community leaders, emergency 
managers, response discipline association, DES Advisory Committee members, and the 
Governor’s Office.  Findings will be used to recommend efforts to initiate 
implementation of the anchor community as the regional model for North Dakota 
Homeland Security.  However, the following considerations will accompany the 
recommendation:   
· Ideas generated from focus group discussions should be introduced to the 
North Dakota Homeland Security Strategic Plan including the formation 
of anchor communities.   
· A regional/state homeland security database developed for equipment and 
training is desirable.   
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· Committees should be formed to provide refinement of the multi-
discipline based equipment/capability lists.   
· Facilitating multi-jurisdictional training and exercised events should be 
expanded.  This is good reason to further investigate other regional plans 
in North Dakota to find elements that may contribute positively to the 
anchor community concept.  It is important to involve local and tribal 
prevention and response disciplines and community leaders in 
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